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Business Risks and the Insurer's
Duty to Defend
Millard Warehouse, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance
Co., 204 Neb. 518, 283 N.W.2d 56 (1979).
I. INTRODUCTION
Damage coverage under a general liability insurance policy de-
pends on the existence of an "occurrence."' However, efforts of
courts and commentators 2 have not yielded a generally accepted
definition of occurrence despite the fact that the word has been
standard in insurance policies since 1966. The lack of a definite un-
derstanding of the scope of coverage guaranteed by an occurrence
basis policy has led to the application of the policy to circum-
stances more appropriately classified as business risks. While
such coverage may often be within the insurance contract, using
judicial interpretation to expand coverage beyond the intent of the
contracting parties could destroy the cost prediction basis of insur-
ance.
Central to a definition of occurrence is the concept of intent.
The implementation of judicial standards for determining whether
actions of both individuals and business entities are intentional
1. "'Occurrence' means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure
to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither ex-
pected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured." Millard Warehouse,
Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 204 Neb. 518, 525, 283 N.W.2d 56, 61 (1979) (quot-
ing the general contract language in the insurance policies issued to Millard
Warehouse).
2. "What is the meaning of the definition of 'occurrence'? No one knows." Even,
The Corporate Insurance Administrator-Problems with the 1966 Revised Lia-
bility Policy, 3 THE FORUM 95, 105 (1968). See generally Bean, The Accident
Versus the Occurrence Concept, 1959 INS. L.J. 550; Hall, Contractors' Liability
Insurance for Property Damage Incidental to Normal Operations-The Stan-
dard Coverage Problem, 16 U. KAN. L. REV. 181 (1968); Rendall, Drink, Drive
and Die! Then Ask Us To Define "Accident", 9 MAN. L.J. 101 (1979); Snow,
Occurrence vs. Accident-Just What Is Covered?, 21 INS. COUNSEL J. 30 (1954);
Wheeler, "Caused by Accident", 1956 INS. L.J. 87.
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has proven difficult.3 Distinctions must be made between in-
tending the acts and intending the results as well as between in-
tended results and those results which are merely foreseeable.
The Nebraska Supreme Court, in Millard Warehouse, Inc. v. Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co.,4 had an opportunity to articulate its appreciation
of these distinctions. The court held that the insured was not to
receive coverage for damages caused by a conscious business deci-
sion under an occurrence basis insurance policy. The court, how-
ever, failed to clearly articulate the judicial standards it applied to
the facts. Neither insurers5 nor insureds will find guidelines in the
decision sufficient to determine the limitations of insurance cover-
age. This note attempts to identify the standards used by the
court. In this attempt, a review of previous rulings and an analysis
of the dissent in Millard Warehouse is necessary.
II. THE DECISION
A. Facts
In response to an action6 filed against Millard Warehouse, Inc.,
by Ralph E. and Marilyn Tetrick, Millard Warehouse notified its
three insurance companies7 and requested that they provide a le-
gal defense according to the terms of their respective policies. The
three insurance companies refused the request on the ground that
their policies did not cover the action as brought. Millard Ware-
house then filed an action against the three defendant-insurance
companies ordering the defendants to satisfy their duty to defend
3. Pfennigstorf, Environmen Damages, and Compensation, 2 Am. BAR FouND.
RES. J. 347, 441 (1979).
4. 204 Neb. 518, 283 N.W.2d 56 (1979).
5. If coverage exists, the insurer has a duty to defend and wants to satisfy that
duty to avoid the consequences of failing to provide full coverage. INsuRER's
DUTy TO DEFEND (D. Hirsch & A. Karpowitz eds. 1978); R. KEETON, INSURANCE
LAw 462-489 (1971); Roos, The Obligation to Defend and Some Related
Problems, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 206 (1961); Comment, The Insurer's Duty to De-
fend Under a Liability Insurance Policy, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 734 (1966).
6. The Tetricks ified their action for "an order requiring Millard Warehouse to
abate and remove the nuisance, or in the alternative, for a judgment against
the Millard Warehouse for $700,000 and general damages." 204 Neb. at 522-23,
283 N.W.2d at 60. It is not entirely clear how an insurance company would
satisfy the judgment against its insured if the order obtained required Mil-
lard Warehouse to "abate and remove the nuisance."
7. Hartford Fire Insurance Company and Fireman's Fund Insurance Company
policies, in addition to other coverages, insured Millard Warehouse by a com-
prehensive general liability clause with limits up to $300,000 for personal in-
jury or property damage. The Insurance Company of the State of
Pennsylvania issued its "umbrella liability policy" which insured the plaintiff
in the sum of $3,000,000 against liability in excess of its underlying insurance
coverages, but subject to a deduction, referred to as a "self-insured retention"
in the amount of $25,000. Id. at 524, 283 N.W.2d at 60.
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and to pay any adverse judgment rendered within the companies'
policy limits. The District Court for Douglas County found that
Hartford and Fireman's Fund, according to the terms of their re-
spective policies, were obligated to defend the plaintiff against the
claims asserted by the Tetricks and to pay any judgment within
the limits of their coverage rendered against Millard Warehouse. 8
Pennsylvania was to satisfy any judgment in excess of the policy
limits of the other two insurance companies subject to any limita-
tions or conditions imposed in Pennsylvania's policy. The three
defendants appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court where the
trial court's decision was reversed.9
Millard Warehouse purchased the land upon which it eventu-
ally built its warehouse at a time when the land was zoned for in-
dustrial use. After it filled in the land and built the pad for its
building, the property along the creek was re-evaluated. Thereaf-
ter, Millard Warehouse's land was classified as floodplain for zon-
ig purposes. The plaintiff was aware of the contentions by
governmental agencies that its construction would obstruct the
streamflow and so Millard Warehouse hired a hydrologist to assist
in planning the construction and to meet the objections against
such construction. Being assured by its expert that the construc-
tion would not obstruct the streamflow, the plaintiff applied for a
zoning change which it received over the veto of the mayor.10
The action subsequently filed by the Tetricks alleged that Mil-
lard Warehouse had created a public nuisance. They specifically
alleged that the building created an artificial obstruction that
would "impair and impede the flow of the water in the west branch
of the Papillion Creek and [would] considerably raise the level of
the water during flood periods so as to flow onto the plaintiffs' (Te-
tricks') land."" Additionally, they alleged $700,000 in damages for
the deprivation of their use of the land. This amount was the esti-
mated cost of raising the level of their land above the floodline.
12
B. Holding
A primary rule of insurance law is that the obligation of the in-
surance company to defend its insured is determined by the na-
ture of the claim brought against the insured.13 The Nebraska rule
8. Id. at 519-20, 283 N.W.2d at 58.
9. Id. The per curiam decision was rendered by a 3-2 panel with Judge Brodkey
writing a strong dissent and District Judge Fahrnbruch joining the dissent.
10. Id. at 522, 283 N.W.2d at 59.
11. Id. at 523, 283 N.W.2d at 60.
12. Id.
13. R. KEETON, supra note 5, at 462. The clause in the general liability insurance
policy setting out the insurer's duty to defend states:
[Vol. 59:772
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is that the duty to defend is "measured by the allegations of the
petition against the insured."'14 In determining if an alleged public
nuisance is within insurance coverage the court must determine
whether the nuisance is an occurrence. In Millard Warehouse, the
court used a brief semantical treatment of the words "accident"
and "occurrence" to reach the conclusion that the Tetricks' peti-
tion, since it alleged a public nuisance, contained no allegations as
to an accident or occurrence sufficient to require the insurance
companies to provide a defense. 15 Citing decisions from other ju-
risdictions for support, 16 the court apparently concluded that an
allegation of nuisance will never qualify for coverage under an oc-
currence basis liability policy.
The court confused and combined several concepts in its at-
tempt to define occurrence in order to arrive at its conclusion that
the facts of Millard Warehouse did not allege an act within that
definition. However, these concepts must be analyzed separately
in order to arrive at a coherent rule that insurance companies
might use to decide whether to defend a particular lawsuit brought
against their insured. The requirement that there be an occur-
rence effectively precludes the duty of an insurer to defend a law-
suit relating to acts determined to be intentional. The court, in
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all the sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
bodily injury or property damage to which this insurance applies,
caused by an occurrence, and the company shall have the right and
duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on ac-
count of such bodily injury or property damage, even if any of the
allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent, and may
make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it
deems expedient, but the company shall not be obligated to pay any
claim or judgment or to defend any suit after the applicable limit of
the Company's liability has been exhausted by payments of judg-
ments or settlements.
204 Neb. at 525, 283 N.W.2d at 61 (quoting from the insurance policies issued
to Millard Warehouse) (emphasis added). If the complaint alleges facts that
if proven will require the insurer to indemnify the insured, the insurer has a
duty to defend. Comment, supra note 5, at 8.
14. 204 Neb. at 527, 283 N.W.2d at 61; Woodman of the World Life Ins. Soc. v. Peter
Kiewit Sons' Co., 196 Neb. 158, 241 N.W.2d 674 (1976); Hartford Acc. & Indem.
Co. v. Olson Bros., Inc., 187 Neb. 179, 188 N.W.2d 699 (1971).
15. 204 Neb. at 528, 283 N.W.2d at 62.
16. See American Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Minnesota Farm Bureau Serv. Co.,
270 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1959); Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co. v. Burch, 38 IlM.
App. 2d 249, 187 N.E.2d 12 (1962); Town of Tieton v. General Ins. Co. of
America, 61 Wash. 2d 716, 380 P.2d 127 (1963); Clark v. London & Lancashire
Indem. Co. of America, 21 Wis. 2d 268, 124 N.W.2d 29 (1963). While the court
cites these cases for the proposition that an allegation of nuisance can never
be construed to be an allegation of an occurrence, that is not the holding of
the cases. Each of these cases analyze the particular facts to determine if the
nuisance was accidental
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determining what is an intentional act, discussed cases dealing
with incidents causing damages as a result of mistakes,' 7 cases
where 'the insured had prior knowledge of the possible conse-
quences, 18 and cases where the insured had been warned of the
potential consequences of his act.19 In its conclusion the court re-
lied on the fact that Millard Warehouse took a calculated business
risk which was outside of its insurance coverage.
20
The dissent, on the other hand, advocated a rule whereby the
insured must have "acted with the specific intent to cause harm to
a third party."21 The dissent determined intent from a subjective
test and attempted to determine the actual intent underlying the
insured's decision.22 To support its conclusion of no intent, it
pointed to the fact that Millard Warehouse had been assured by an
expert that its location decision would not cause flooding.
In response to the initial portion of the majority's decision, the
dissent rejected the ideas that an allegation of nuisance is always
outside of policy coverage or that the duty to defend ought to be
determined exclusively from the allegations in the petition.23 In
addition, both the majority and the dissenting judges recognized
the unsettled condition of the law in this area.
I. ANALYSIS
A close consideration of the impact of Millard Warehouse
reveals that premiums remain lower since coverage is not provided
to those businesses which intentionally make business judgments
irrespective of the potential consequences. 24 Business people
should appreciate that premium costs are truly based on
probability,25 and these costs should not be prejudiced by the in-
tentional acts of others attempting to transfer the costs of their
own bad decisions to the insurance company and ultimately to the
17. See Thomason v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 248 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1957);
Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Gerrits, 65 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1953); Foxley & Co. v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 203 Neb. 165, 277 N.W.2d 686 (1979).
18. See Town of Tieton v. General Ins. Co. of America, 61 Wash. 2d 716, 380 P.2d
127 (1963).
19. See City of Kimball v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 190 Neb. 152, 206
N.W.2d 632 (1973).
20. 204 Neb. at 530, 283 N.W.2d at 63.
21. Id. at 534, 283 N.W.2d at 65 (emphasis in original) (Brodkey, J., dissenting).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 535-37, 283 N.W.2d at 65-66.
24. Insurance premiums are determined from probabilities that an event will oc-
cur and are not meant to be sufficient to provide coverage for those events
that are substantially certain to happen.
25. See generally J. LONG & D. GREGG, PROPERTY AND LiABmxrY INSURANCE HAND-
BOOK (1965); E. PATTERSON, ESSENTIAIS OF INSURANCE LAw (1935); C. WiL-
LIAMS & R. HEiNS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE (3d ed. 1976).
[Vol. 59:772
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other insurers. Unfortunately, after reading the opinion neither in-
surers nor insureds will be able to predict with any degree of cer-
tainty the court's standard for determining the extent of liability
coverage. This legal haze stems from the general uncertainty of
the field, in addition to the court's inadequate articulation of the
reasoning used to reach its decision.
A. Nuisance as an Occurrence
By not basing its decision on the proposition that an allegation
of nuisance does not satisfy the requirement for an occurrence,
2 6
the court avoided adopting a rule that would preclude future
courts from considering the nature of the insured's conduct in de-
termining liability for nuisances. Decisions which assert that nui-
sance is a condition and not an actionable act present a clearer
understanding of the concept of nuisance.27 Before deciding the
insurance company has a duty to defend, the better analysis is to
first determine what kind of nuisance is being alleged: intentional,
negligent, or accidental. 2s A flat statement that a nuisance is not
an occurrence and therefore not within the policy coverage would
mean cases of accidental pollution or other accidentally caused
nuisances would be excluded from coverage where coverage could
reasonably be expected by the insured parties. The accidental nui-
sance cases, where long-term damage rather than damage from a
sudden, unexpected event occurred, were just the type of cases
contemplated by the insurance companies when they substituted
the word "occurrence" for "accident" in the general liability pol-
26. 204 Neb. at 527, 283 N.W.2d at 61.
27. See White v. Smith, 440 S.W.2d 497, 509 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) ("[G]arnishee
argues that plaintiff's suit was 'a nuisance case, not an accident case' ....
Garnishee's apparent assumption that 'a nuisance case' cannot be 'an acci-
dent case' is untenable. Although ... negligence is not a necessary ingredi-
ent of the wrong of maintaining a nuisance... negligence and nuisance may
and frequently do coexist.")
28. A leading authority comments:
Nuisance is a field of tort liability... [and] has reference to the in-
terests invaded, to the damage or harm inflicted, and not to any par-
ticular kind of act or omission which has led to the invasion. The
attempt frequently made to distinguish between nuisance and negli-
gence, for example, is based upon an entirely mistaken emphasis
upon what the defendant has done rather than the result which has
followed, and forgets completely the well established fact that negli-
gence is merely one type of conduct which may give rise to a nui-
sance.... Today liability for nuisance may rest upon an intentional
invasion of the plaintiff's interests, or a negligent one, or conduct
which is abnormal and out of place in its surroundings, and so falls
within the principle of strict liability.
W. PRosS F, LAw OF TORTS 573-74 (4th ed. 1971).
1980]
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icy.2 9 Accordingly, the court proceeded to discuss whether the ac-
tual act committed by Millard Warehouse was an occurrence.
30
B. Intentional Acts Exclusion
The exclusion of intentional acts from coverage under a liability
policy is derived from an important theory of insurance law; the
theory of risks assumed and losses apportioned among a pool of
insureds. The insurer "is able to properly set premiums and sup-
ply coverage only if those losses are uncertain from the standpoint
of any single policyholder. If the single insured is allowed through
intentional or reckless acts to consciously control the risks covered
by the policy, a central concept of insurance is violated."' 31 If the
courts' treatment of claims under the liability policies do not co-
here with the expectations of the insurers as to the limits of cover-
age, then the insurers will either have to redefine the extent of
their coverage or raise their premiums.
32
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, as cited in the Millard Ware-
house dissent, set out three general theories regarding the con-
struction of the intentional tort exclusion in liability policies:
(1) The minority view follows the classic tort doctrine of looking to the
natural and probable consequences of the insured's act; (2) The majority
view is that the insured must have intended the act and to cause some
kind of bodily injury; (3) A third view is that the insured must have had
the specific intent to cause the type of injury suffered.
3 3
It is asserted that Nebraska adopted the majority view in State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Muth34 and that contrary to the opinion of
the dissent, the court's decision in Millard Warehouse is in con-
formance with the majority theory. In Muth, the court determined
that the injuries from a personal injury accident were covered
under a homeowner's liability policy. The insured fired a B-B gun
from a slow-moving truck intending to scare the injured party but
instead struck him in the eye causing a loss of sight. The court
accepted the determination of the trial court which held that the
insured did not intend the injury and further said that,
an injury is either expected or intended if the insured acted with the spe-
cific intent to cause harm to a third party. It seems to us to be immaterial
whether the injury which results was specifically intended, i.e., the exclu-
sion would apply even though the injury is different from that intended or
anticipated.
3 0
29. Pfennigstorf, supra note 3, at 439.
30. 204 Neb. at 528, 283 N.W.2d at 62.
31. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Bartlett, 307 Minn. 72, 78, 240 N.W.2d 310, 313 (1976).
32. Pfennigstorf, supra note 3, at 434.
33. Pachucki v. Republic Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 703, 708, 278 N.W.2d 898, 901 (1979).
34. 190 Neb. 248, 207 N.W.2d 364 (1973). This was an unanimous decision by the
full court.
35. Id. at 252, 207 N.W.2d at 366.
[Vol. 59:772
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Both the majority and the dissent in Millard Warehouse could
have cited Muth in support of their decision. It will be argued that
it is the definition of intent and its application, not the acceptance
of the general theory, that divided the court.
The Wisconsin court added a further description of the majority
position not cited by the dissent in Millard Warehouse:
(1) it is necessary that the insured intend both the act as well as in-
tending to cause bodily injury in order for the exclusion to apply; (2) in-
tent may be actual or may be inferred by the nature of the act and the
accompanying reasonable foreseeability of harm; (3) once it is found that
harm was intended, it is immaterial that the actual harm caused is of a
different character or magnitude than that intended.
36
It is important to note that the Millard Warehouse court did not
adequately address the three issues suggested by the majority po-
sition: (1) what must be intended; (2) how is intent to be deter-
mined; and (3) how the determination of the intent of a business
entity differs from determining that of an individual.
In negligence cases, courts have distinguished between an in-
tended act and an intended result.3 7 Insurance coverage is gener-
ally accepted as applicable in the case of an intended act but
unintended result. An insured may act to intentionally cause a
certain injury in which case coverage will be denied, but it may
also act intentionally with the resulting damage being uninten-
tional and unexpected in which case coverage may be found.3 8 In
some cases negligence has been the cause of the injury or destruc-
tion of property and yet the courts have focused on what result
was intended rather than on whether the act itself was intended.
3 9
Even the "unintentional or unforeseen consequences of reckless
or negligent acts are within the definition of 'accident' if the acts
were not undertaken with malice or intent to injure the person or
36. Id. at 709, 278 N.W.2d at 901.
37. See, e.g., White v. Smith, 440 S.W.2d 497, 507 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969). But cf. Mof-
fat v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of New York, 238 F. Supp. 165 (M.D. Pa. 1964)
(even though the insured should have known consequences would occur, the
court held that the insured did not intend trespass).
38. See, e.g., The Travelers v. Humming Bird Coal Co., 371 S.W.2d 35 (Ky. 1963)
(earth mass slipping and damaging water supply was an unforeseen and un-
expected consequence of mining); McGroarty v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 36 N.Y.2d
358, 329 N.E.2d 172, 368 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1975) (building garage so close was pur-
posive, but the damage was unintended); Gruol Constr. Co., Inc. v. Insurance
Co. of North America, 11 Wash. App. 632, 524 P.2d 427 (1974) (dry rot was a
condition which unexpectedly and unintentionally caused injury). Contra C.
Y. Thomason v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 183 F.2d 729 (4th Cir. 1950) (not
an accident when construction company blocked ingress and egress of busi-
ness).
39. Northwestern Elect. Power Coop., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 451
S.W.2d 356 (Mo. App. 1969); Messersmith v. American Fid. Co., 232 N.Y. 161,
133 N.E. 432, (1921).
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property hurt."40 A "transaction as a whole" test 4 ' has been articu-
lated to determine whether the term "accident" is applicable to a
given situation, recognizing that "it is not legally impossible to find
accidental results flowing from intentional causes, i.e., that the re-
sulting damage was unintended although the original act or acts
leading to the damage were intentional.
'42
The court has recognized coverage where the act was inten-
tional and yet not intended to cause damage.4 3 In City of Kimball
v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.,44 the Nebraska Supreme
Court held that the pollution of an irrigation well of a judgment
creditor was within the coverage of the city's insurance policy pro-
tecting it against liability for accidents. 45 While the city intention-
ally built the irrigation well, the resulting damage was held to be
accidental.46 The decision left uncertainty as to why the results of
the city's act were held to be accidental. It is not clear whether it is
the fact the city was reckless or negligent in not foreseeing possi-
ble seepage or whether the act was held to be unintentional be-
cause the city received no warning of the possible consequences.
4 7
40. McGroarty v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 43 A.D.2d 368, 377, 351 N.Y.S.2d 428, 436
(1974), afd, 36 N.Y.2d 358, 329 N.E.2d 172, 368 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1975).
41. McGroarty v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 36 N.Y.2d 358, 364, 329 N.E.2d 172, 175, 368
N.Y.S.2d 485, 490 (1975).
42. Id. According to the position taken by this note the decision in McGroarty
cannot be supported. The calculated risk the contractor took in building in
the manner he did caused the pressure against the plaintiff's building and the
resulting damage cannot be classified as an accident. The contractor made a
business decision being fully aware of its possible consequences and should
not be allowed to claim insurance coverage. Earlier in the opinion, the court
gives as an example of a calculated risk the running of a red light and the
resulting collision. The public has come to accept calculated risks taken with
a car as qualifying as accidents under automobile liability insurance and in
order to protect the injured, recovery should not be denied. See Rendall,
supra note 2.
43. Wolk v. Royal Indem. Co., 27 Misc. 2d 478, 485, 210 N.Y.S.2d 677, 683 (1961).
44. City of Kimball v. St. Paul and Marine Ins. Co., 190 Neb. 152, 206 N.W.2d 632
(1973).
45. Id. The city of Kimball had constructed a sewage lagoon on land adjacent to
Strauch. In 1963, Strauch submitted a claim to the city alleging that seepage
from the lagoon had polluted his irrigation water. When St. Paul refused to
defend the action by Strauch against the city, the action proceeded to trial.
At the trial it was determined that the city was negligent in not discovering
and then filling the seismograph holes in the bottom of the lagoon which al-
lowed sewage to flow and seep into the underground waters from which
Strauch obtained his irrigation water. Id. at 154, 206 N.W.2d at 634.
46. Policy coverage was determined on whether the damage was expected or in-
tended from the viewpoint of the injured party. Current policy language
states that the damage be "neither expected nor intended from the stand-
point of the insured." Id. at 161, 206 N.W.2d at 637.
47. The dissent, quoting Hayden v. Insurance Co. of North America, 5 Wash. App.
710, 490 P.2d 454 (1971), states that an "'[a]ccident within [the] terms of (an]
[Vol. 59:772
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The Millard Warehouse court, in distinguishing City of Kimball,
noted the reliance placed on the fact "there was no evidence that
the city ever had any knowledge of the possibility of contamination
of the well."48 It was this lack of knowledge which supported a
finding that it did not intend the harm.49
Although damages caused by mistake or error have not re-
ceived consistent treatment by the courts,50 the Nebraska
Supreme Court has denied coverage where the result is intended,
even though the fact that it causes injury is the result of a mis-
take.5 1 In Foxley & Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
5 2
Foxley, believing it owned the property on which a water-line sys-
tem and hydrants were located, caused several hydrants to be sev-
ered from the system resulting in damage. This was the result
Foxley intended even though it did not intend that the system ac-
tually be owned by another party. When the other party brought
suit for damages, Foxley requested its insurance company to de-
fend. The company refused and the court found that insurance
coverage did not exist. In support of its decision, the court said
that the resulting damage, while caused by a mistake of law, was
the intended result and therefore not an accident within coverage
of the policy.
53
Like Foxley, Millard Warehouse acted intentionally in choosing
accident policy is never present when [a] deliberate act is performed, unless
some additional, unexpected, independent and unforeseen happening occurs
which produces or brings about the results of injury or death."' 190 Neb. at
167, 206 N.W.2d at 640.
48. 204 Neb. at 530-31, 283 N.W.2d at 63. If the insured will be covered as long as it
does not know that its actions might cause damage there is no incentive to do
any preventive research.
49. See notes 54-56 & accompanying text infra.
50. See Haynes v. American Cas. Co., 228 Md. 394, 179 A.2d 900 (1962) (employees
mistakenly crossed boundary line and cut down trees, court held damage
caused by accident); York Indus. Center, Inc., v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co., 271
N.C. 158, 155 S.E.2d 501 (1967) (due to error as to location of boundary line
trees were cut down on neighboring property and court held for coverage).
But see Thomason v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 248 F.2d 417 (5th Cir.
1957) (no coverage when employees bulldozed property up to wrong set of
metal stakes causing damage to neighboring golf course: "Where acts are vol-
untary and intentional and the injury is the natural result of the act, the re-
sult was not caused by accident even though the result may have been
unexpected, unforeseen and unintended. There was no insurance against lia-
bility for damages caused by mistake or error." Id. at 419). See also Hard-
ware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Gerrits, 65 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1953) (not an accident when
insured built on another's land in reliance on the boundary line located by a
surveyor).
51. Foxley & Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 203 Neb. 165,277 N.W.2d 686
(1979).
52. Id. at 169, 277 N.W.2d at 688.
53. Id.
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the location for its warehouse. Millard Warehouse argued that it
relied on the assurance of its expert that the building would not be
in the floodplain. The mistaken reliance on its expert does not sup-
port the argument that any alleged resulting damage was due to an
occurrence.5 4 The decision to build was made with the knowledge
that governmental agencies were contending that the project
would be an obstruction in the Papillion Creek.55 The court cor-
rectly recognized the inequitable results possible if the insured
who has been advised by an expert who is in error, is granted cov-
erage under his liability policy when an insured who makes an er-
ror on his own is not.5 6 A more equitable conclusion occurs when
the insurer of the expert is held liable to cover the results of the
expert's opinion as long as such coverage was within the under-
standing of the expert and his insurer in their contract.
In determining intent, the dominant factors should include both
the conduct and the state of mind of the insured.5 7 Intent may be
of a subjective quality as was apparently required by the court in
Muth and City of Kimball. On the other hand, the court in the
past has recognized some acts are so certain to cause injury or
harm that, from their very occurrence, the court will infer the in-
sured's intent.5 8 This recognition occurred in Jones v. Norval,5 9 a
personal injury case. The insured, Norval, hit Jones with sufficient
force of his fist to knock Jones out. The court's discussion of intent
noted Norval's testimony that he only intended to "sting" Jones.
60
The court mixed two concepts in determining coverage did not ex-
ist. First it appeared to adopt a classic tort theory under which the
insured "must be said to expect or intend the natural, normal cir-
cumstances of his own intentional act."61 It then limited the "natu-
ral consequences of the act" rule and recognized "the correlation
only where reason mandates that from the very nature of the act,
harm to the injured party must have been intended.
'62
54. The court's decision does not discuss whether the damages alleged were
within the scope of the policy and that issue will not be discussed in this note.
55. 204 Neb. at 521, 283 N.W.2d at 59.
56. Id. at 531-32, 283 N.W.2d at 64. It is suggested a traditional tort standard of
reasonably prudent behavior be applied. City of Carter Lake v. The Aetna
Cas. and Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1059 n.4 (8th Cir. 1979).
57. Rendall, supra note 2.
58. Cf. Continental Western Ins. Co. v. Toal, 309 Minn. 169, 244 N.W.2d 121 (1976)
(court inferred defendant's intent to injure when killing occurred during a
robbery). But ef. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 104 (1966) (insurer obliged to defend assault action).
59. 203 Neb. 549, 279 N.W.2d 388 (1979).
60. Id. at 551, 279 N.W.2d at 390.
61. Id. at 552, 279 N.W.2d at 390.
62. 203 Neb. at 554, 279 N.W.2d at 391. The dissenting opinion, written by Judge
Brodkey, must be noted since he was also the author of the dissent in Millard
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In City of Kimball the court disagreed on whether the damage
was so certain to occur as to deny coverage. The dissent, in argu-
ing against coverage, stated: "[W] hen damage results from a will-
ful and deliberate act and such damage is practically certain to
occur under the immutable law of nature, it must be considered to
have been intended or recklessly disregarded and it certainly is
not 'caused by accident.' -63 It is asserted that adoption of this rule
will effectuate the expectations of both the insureds and insurers.
The concept of expectability is basic to the determination that
damage or injury is intended.64 Unfortunately the courts have at-
tempted to equate the concept of expectability with foreseeability
in determining whether an insured's acts were intentional.65 The
Millard Warehouse court relied on the decision in Town of Tieton
v. General Ins. Co. of America,66 to assert that the element of fore-
seeability must be considered in determining if Millard Warehouse
was covered.67 In Town of Tieton, the town was aware of the po-
tential hazard of pollution due to seepage from the sewage lagoon
and thus was held to expect the resulting damage. Adoption of a
foreseeability doctrine might lead to the inequitable consequences
feared in Hutchinson Water Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co.,68 that insurance coverage would completely lose its effective-
ness as a protection from fortuitous occurrences. Under such a
rule "if the damage was foreseeable then the insured is liable, but
there is no coverage, and if the damage is not foreseeable, there is
coverage, but the insured is not liable. '69 Thus, it is suggested that
a foreseeability standard is contrary to the purpose of insurance.
70
One court has observed that
The reasonable expectation of an insured in securing a comprehensive
general liability policy is that it will cover some negligent acts. It does not
follow, however, that because the policy covers some negligent acts it
Warehouse. In both cases he differs with the majority in the standard to be
applied to intentional acts exclusions, advocating that the insured must in-
tend to cause the physical harm that occurs.
63. Id. at 168, 206 N.W.2d at 641.
64. Damage or injury to be covered must be "neither expected nor intended from
the standpoint of the insured." 204 Neb. at 525, 283 N.W.2d at 61 (emphasis
added).
65. See City of Aurora v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1964);
Gassaway v. Travelers Ins. Co., 222 Tenn. 649, 439 S.W.2d 605 (1969); Town of
Tieton v. General Ins. Co. of America, 61 Wash. 2d 716, 380 P.2d 127 (1963).
66. 61 Wash. 2d 716, 380 P.2d 127 (1963).
67. 204 Neb. at 530, 283 N.W.2d at 63.
68. 250 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1957).
69. City of Carter Lake v. The Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1058 (8th
Cir. 1979). If the damage is not foreseeable then the insured is not negligent
and there is no basis for a cause of action.
70. Id.
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must cover all negligent acts. An insured need not know to a virtual cer-
tainty that a result will follow its acts or omissions for the result to be
expected.
7 1
The Nebraska Supreme Court is divided as to whether the in-
sured must intend the actual result that occurs. In Muth it seems
to find coverage because the insured was not certain the
B-B would hit a person and therefore was covered by the insur-
ance policy.7 2 In Jones v. Norval, the majority and the dissent split
on this very issue with the dissent requiring an intent to cause the
specific injury before excluding coverage.73 The dissent in Millard
Warehouse required this same specific intent before it would find
no coverage noting that "Millard Warehouse did not build the pad
or the warehouse with the specific intention of causing harm to the
Tetricks or any other person. '74 Since insurance is to serve the
reasonable expectations of the parties, the use of either a standard
of reasonable foreseeability or requiring virtual certainty would
fail to serve these expectations. Instead, a standard of ex-
pectability should be substituted with the intentional act exclusion
clause applying if there is "a substantial probability that certain
consequences will result from his actions."
75
Although Millard Warehouse was aware of the contentions by
governmental agencies and others that the warehouse was being
built within the floodplain and that it allegedly would act as an ob-
struction, it proceeded with the building plans. The suit by an up-
stream landowner alleging that its land was put in the floodplain
was hardly an unexpected result. While Millard Warehouse may
not have actually intended the harm, the result which occurred
cannot be held to be unexpected and thus unintended. Admittedly
it is difficult to define when the results of an insured's act are so
certain to occur that the insured is held to intend the results76 and
the other situation where the resulting damage was unexpected.
77
The economics of business liability insurance would be severely
threatened if acts such as those of Millard Warehouse building are
considered accidents. Millard Warehouse was aware of the contro-
versy surrounding its decision to build78 and the possibility of
71. Id.
72. 190 Neb. 248, 207 N.W.2d 364.
73. 203 Neb. 549, 279 N.W.2d 388.
74. 204 Neb. at 534, 283 N.W.2d at 65.
75. 604 F.2d at 1058-59.
76. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Harris & Brooks, Inc., 248 Md. 148, 235 A.2d 556
(1967); Town of Tieton v. General Ins. Co. of America, 61 Wash. 2d 716, 380
P.2d 127 (1963).
77. City of Kimball v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 190 Neb. 152, 206 N.W.2d
632 (1973); Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co. v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,
416 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. 1967).
78. Millard Warehouse was completely aware of the controversy surrounding its
decision and the very fact it had to secure new zoning for the area under
heavy challenge from other entities put it on notice that its building was ar-
[Vol. 59:772
INSURANCE
damage, therefore the three insurance companies and their pools
of insureds should not have to compensate for the resulting dam-
age.
C. Business Judgment Decision
A basic corollary to denying liability insurance coverage for
damages which are expected or foreseeable consequences of an in-
tentional or negligent act is the denial of coverage for damages re-
sulting from business judgment decisions. The costs of these
decisions when they cause damages or injuries to others as a regu-
lar and expected consequence of the operation of the business are
no longer insurance risks, but should be figured into the cost of
operating the business.
79
Both his know-how and his ethics should remain the enterpriser's risk.
The insurer should permit the enterpriser to sink or swim on the basis of
his ability to compete in his own field. It has no business guaranteeing in
any way the success of the enterprise. That is the function of manage-
ment. Some of us have come to call this the 'business risk', and we are
concerned because some current interpretations of 'caused by accident'
are making the insurer assume the risk.
80
In order for the insurer to determine the premium costs for his
insurance policies it must be clearly understood exactly what
eventualities are covered.8 1 If the courts re-interpret the contract
provisions between the insureds and insurers then the insurer
must either adjust the scope of his coverage or increase the premi-
ums. 82 Certain contingencies derived from the operation of a busi-
ness, such as employee injury, are appropriate risks for liability
coverage. Acts committed by the insured which were purposely
designed to cause harm or injury as well as acts exclusively in-
tended to further the insured's business are not appropriate risks
for coverage by liability insurance.
83
Businesspersons who knowingly maintain dangerous condi-
tions are often not covered by their general liability insurance poli-
cies. This has been true whether the condition was the emission of
guably in the floodplain. An upstream landowner claiming loss of use of his
land because of the raising of the flood level was not unforeseeable. 204 Neb.
at 520-23, 283 N.W.2d at 59-60.
79. R. KEETON, supra note 5, at 297.
80. Bean, supra note 2, at 556.
81. J. LONG & D. GREGG, supra note 25. If an insured is operating his plant in
such a manner that foreign substances are emitted into the atmosphere and
wants coverage as to any lawsuits filed against him for this act, coverage must
be specifically allowed by his insurer with the resulting premium costs to
cover this risk.
82. Id.
83. Pfennigstorf, supra note 3, at 434.
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foreign substances in the air,8 4 the possibility of water contamina-
tion,85 or the possibility of sewage backup 86 or flooding87 caused by
the manner in which construction was performed or where it was
located. Also not covered are situations where the insured either
breached his contract 88 or performed inadequately89 or in an un-
workmanlike manner 90 resulting in damages, unless it was shown
that he took reasonable precautions that should have prevented
the harm9 ' or some unexpected and unprecedented event inter-
84. See, e.g., American Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Minnesota Farm Bureau Serv.
Co., 270 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1959) (blasting noise and vibrations); Farmers Elev.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Burch, 38 M1. App. 2d 249, 187 N.E.2d 12 (1962) (dust from grain
elevator); Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Harris & Brooks, Inc., 248 Md. 148, 235
A.2d 556 (1967) (smoke and soot from burning tires); United States Fid. &
Guar. Co. v. Briscoe, 205 Okla. 618, 239 P.2d 754 (1952) (cement dust); Clark v.
London & Lancashire Indem. Co. of America, 21 Wis. 2d 268, 124 N.W.2d 29
(1963) (smells and rodents from open gravel pit). Contra Grand River Lime
Co. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 32 Ohio App. 2d 178, 289 N.E.2d 360 (1972) (seven
years emission of air pollutants).
85. See, e.g., Town of Tieton v. General Ins. Co. of America, 61 Wash. 2d 716, 380
P.2d 127 (1963) (had warnings of possible contamination). Contra City of
Kimball v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 190 Neb. 152, 206 N.W.2d 632
(1973) (no warnings of possible contamination).
86. See, e.g., City of Carter Lake v. The Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052 (8th
Cir. 1979) (continuing damages from flooding after city learned of damage
held not accidental); City of Aurora v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 905
(10th Cir. 1964) (unprecedented rainfall causing sewage backup not acciden-
tal).
87. See, e.g., Albuquerque Gravel Prod. Co. v. American Employers Ins. Co., 282
F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1960) (ramp built in arroyo causing damage from not un-
precedented floods not accident); Ladner & Co., Inc. v. Southern Guaranty
Ins., 347 S. 2d 100 (Ala. 1977) (suits filed alleging intentional acts of insured
caused damage by flooding); Gassaway v. Travelers Ins. Co., 222 Tenn. 649,
439 S.W.2d 605 (1969) (seller-insured knew of drainage facilities whose flood-
ing caused damage and did not disclose, held not accident). Contra Wolk v.
Royal Indem. Co., 27 Misc. 2d 478, 210 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1961) (held an accident
when insured altered contours of golf course which led to flooding on neigh-
boring land).
88. See, e.g., Neale Constr. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 199 F.2d 591 (10th
Cir. 1952) (damage caused by negligent performance of work).
89. See, e.g., Hutchinson Water Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 250 F.2d
892 (10th Cir. 1957) (insured's negligent failure to provide sufficient water
pressure to put out fire held not accident); Midland Const. Co. v. United
States Cas. Co., 214 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1954) (insured's failure to cover roof
from afternoon shower not an accident).
90. See, e.g., Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Bartlett, 307 Minn. 78,240 N.W.2d 310 (1976)
(held no coverage when person intentionally constructed masonry wall in un-
workmanlike manner).
91. See, e.g., Cross v. Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co., 184 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1950)
(sprayed windows with water to prevent damage from acid used to clean
building); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Terrace Enterprises, Inc., - Minn. -, 260
N.W.2d 450 (1977) (settling damage to building caused by negligent backfill-
ing).
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vened leading to the resulting damage.92
The denial of coverage in these situations makes it clear that
insurance companies can no longer be used "to act as subcontrac-
tors of every business risk."93 The information available to busi-
nesspersons makes it possible for them to weigh the impact of
their decisions and then make their choices.
[M]anagement decisions setting up and directing the operation of a busi-
ness, choosing plant location, establishing production methods, and se-
lecting equipment are expected to be made on the basis of a careful
analysis of all cost and risk factors including the risk that third persons
wi be harmed by unavoidable though unwanted side effects. Third party
claims that were foreseeable at the time of management decision making
and that like other cost figures should have been included in the calcula-
tions then made are not intended to be covered by a liability insurance
policy.
94
Millard Warehouse had fully apprised itself of the cost and risk
factors associated with building its warehouse in a location deter-
mined by governmental entities and experts in the field to be
within the floodplain. Although Millard's privately hired expert
supported the location decision, the surrounding controversy was
sufficient to put the prudent and responsible businessperson on
notice that the risk of being sued for obstructing the streamflow
must be considered as a cost of his decision.95 The court correctly
recognized that in following the advice of his own expert in locat-
ing the warehouse "he [president of Millard Warehouse] took a
calculated risk ... after being advised of the possibility of flood
damage." 96
Insured companies are in business to make profits and there-
fore will make decisions that provide them with economic benefits.
It is assumed that Millard Warehouse's location decision was
based on the fact t1-Pat the location beside the Papillion Creek was
the most economical. It received economic benefits from its deci-
sion and therefore should not be allowed to demand indemnifica-
tion for the costs of its decision from the insurance company and
the rest of the pool of insureds. Businesses seeking liability insur-
ance do not want to be categorized in actuarial tables with busi-
nesses which intentionally choose to act in a manner which expose
them to foreseeable liability. Generally insurance is purchased to
protect against "pure risks, 9 7 risks "when there is a chance of loss
92. See, e.g., Chapman Constr. Co. v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 297 Minn. 406,211 N.W.2d
871 (1973) (insured was sued for obstructing businesses with construction de-
lay caused by unprecedented rainfall).
93. Even, supra note 2, at 95.
94. Pfennigstorf, supra note 3, at 436 (emphasis added).
95. Id.
96. 204 Neb. at 532, 283 N.W.2d at 64.
97. C. WILLIAMs & R. HEms, supra note 25, at 208.
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but no chance of gain,"98 and a basic condition is that the loss be
accidental from the viewpoint of the insured. The public policy be-
hind liability insurance, is as much concerned with assuring that
costs are internalized to the wrongdoer as with protecting the in-
jured.99
IV. CONCLUSION
While the court may not agree that it has accepted the majority
view of the intentional act exclusion, the preceding discussion has
shown that this is the case. It is upon the definition of intent which
the court is not in agreement. Part of the divisiveness is due to the
problems inherent in distinguishing between an individual's intent
and the intent manifested by a business entity. The cause and ef-
fect of an individual's action is more readily ascertainable which
aids in the determination whether the individual possessed the
subjective intent to cause the harm or if the action was of such a
nature that harm was substantially certain to result.
More difficult is the problem of determining the intent of a busi-
ness entity. The business entity should rely on a more structured
decision-making process and therefore be credited with more
knowledge of the consequences of its actions. Hence, actions
which cause results that were or should have been within the con-
templation of the insured are held to be intentional. This ascrip-
tion of superior knowledge could also be applicable to the
individual with expert knowledge who could readily anticipate the
probable results and thus is held to intend the resulting harm.100
In order to apply the exclusion, an insured need not know with
certainty that a result will occur, but merely that a substantial
probability exists. The knowledge ascribed to the insured should
be considered in deciding if the insured felt there was a substan-
tial probability of harm.
The policy behind the interpretation of the intentional act ex-
clusion is to promote the reasonable expectations of both the in-
sured and the insurer. The differentiation of occurrence and mere
business risks fulfills this policy. By recognizing that general lia-
bility insurance policies are not to be construed to cover business
risks not clearly contemplated by both the insurer and the insured,
the court preserves a basic tenet of insurance: only risks are to be
98. Id. at 10.
99. Pfennigstorf, supra note 3, at 432.
100. Kraus v. Allstate, 379 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1967). Insured was a professional de-
molitions expert and aware of the destructive range of dynamite. Following
an explosion which killed the insured and his wife and injured a bystander,
the court held the injury to the bystander intentional and thus not within
coverage of the deceased's insurance policy. Id.
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insured. Businesspersons cannot transfer the risks of their busi-
ness judgments to the insurance company and other insureds
without specific contract provision and adjustments in premiums.
The burden is on the insurance companies to write contracts that
make clear the limits of coverage, the courts cannot be used to ex-
pand coverage beyond the policy contract.
Pamela M. Hastings '81
